The Pathological Alliance by Ganguly, Sumit
Few of America’s bilateral ties have been as fraught as those with Pakistan. Since 1958, when the two countries forged a military 
pact, the relationship has been based on dubious 
premises, false expectations, periodic quarrels, 
and episodic tensions. Apart from a small com-
munity of scholars and policy makers, few are 
aware that it was Pakistan, not the United States, 
which had avidly courted 
the other. Deft Pakistani 
diplomacy, almost immedi-
ately after the creation of the 
state, persuaded the naïve 
administration of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower that Pakistan could swiftly emerge as 
a staunch anticommunist ally. British officials, still 
smarting from the end of their empire in India and 
keen on retaining influence in the region, disin-
genuously encouraged this belief. 
At least three scholars—Mannakal Venkataramani, 
Ayesha Jalal, and Robert McMahon—have written 
with authority on the early years of this relation-
ship and the problematic assumptions that under-
girded it. Jalal’s work, The State of Martial Rule: The 
Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense, 
unlike those of Venkataramani (The American Role 
in Pakistan, 1947–1958) and McMahon (The Cold 
War on the Periphery), deals less with the formation 
of the bilateral alliance and more with the political 
conditions within Pakistan that proved propitious 
for the forging of the security relationship. Dennis 
Kux, a former US Foreign Service officer, in his 
book The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: 
Disenchanted Allies, provided a largely descriptive 
(and somewhat potted) account of the relation-
ship. Kux’s book, as well as the three others before 
it, relied almost exclusively on American (and in 
Jalal’s case British) archival sources.
Given the paucity of reliable and up-to-date 
sources on this long-troubled relationship, Husain 
Haqqani’s book Magnificent Delusions represents 
a milestone. Haqqani, a former journalist, served 
as Pakistani ambassador to the United States 
from 2008 to 2011, and is currently a professor 
of international relations at Boston University. He 
writes with clarity and verve, and has made care-
ful use of recently declassified American archives, 
combined with his extraordinary grasp of his 
country’s contemporary his-
tory and politics. He has 
produced what is, to date, 
easily the most candid, read-
able, and insightful account 
of the US-Pakistan relation-
ship’s evolution.
As the book’s title makes clear, this is a tale of 
mutual and grand delusions. These misapprehen-
sions have been compounded by deeply flawed 
American expectations of Pakistan and deeply 
duplicitous Pakistani behavior. It is quite remark-
able that Haqqani, who served his country loyally, 
can write with such painful honesty.
Haggani affirms that Pakistani decision makers 
successfully deployed the communist bogey from 
the very genesis of this relationship. He reminds 
his readers that, despite sounding the tocsin 
about the possible Soviet penetration of South 
Asia, Pakistan’s leadership was almost completely 
obsessed with building a formidable military bul-
wark against its sworn enemy, India. The United 
States, which had paid scant heed to the region 
and knew little about it, was soon inveigled into 
fashioning an important military relationship with 
Pakistan. 
Haqqani shows that despite American mili-
tary and economic largess, Pakistan’s leadership, 
both military and civilian, has rarely been satis-
fied. Instead, it has almost always sought more 
than what the United States was prepared to 
grant, whether in terms of military, economic, or 
even diplomatic assistance. A constant Pakistani 
refrain is that Washington has never quite seen 




SuMiT ganguly, a Current History contributing editor, is a 
professor of political science at Indiana University, Bloom-




Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the 
United States, and an Epic History  
of Misunderstanding




 http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/112/751/165/390094/curh_113_762_165.pdf by guest on 27 O
ctober 2020
166 •  CURRENT HISTORY  •  April 2014
Among other issues that have proved to be 
leitmotifs in the relationship, one is the  Pakistani 
leadership’s propensity for mythmaking. In 1965, 
for example, it assumed that anti-Indian senti-
ment in Kashmir would translate into support for 
Pakistan, but that did not happen during a brief 
war over the disputed territory. Haqqani’s discus-
sion of the pathologies of Pakistani decision mak-
ing during the 1971 crisis that led to Bangladesh’s 
independence is brutally frank. He also shows that 
after the crisis, instead of engaging in serious intro-
spection about its own egregious errors, the leader-
ship chose to place the blame on Indian perfidy. 
Worse still, when faced with adverse develop-
ments in the bilateral relationship or confronted 
with the consequences of flawed choices, the 
leadership has taken refuge in conspiracy theo-
ries. When seeking to ascertain the precise degree 
of support that the Nixon administration was 
willing to provide Pakistan at the height of the 
1971 crisis, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto con-
cocted a bizarre tale about a possible plot between 
Afghanistan and India to pursue the dismember-
ment of Pakistan. 
mutual Delusion
Of course, the delusions that have haunted 
the relationship are by no means one-sided. The 
United States, which accepted Pakistani claims 
of a shared anticommunist mission in the 1950s, 
again fell prey to similar blandishments at the 
time of the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan in 1979. Washington backed away 
from exerting pressure on Islamabad to terminate 
its nuclear weapons program when General Zia 
ul-Haq denied its existence, even though the US 
interlocutor, General Vernon Walters, concluded 
that Zia was lying. The United States bought into 
the Pakistani argument that suitable American 
military assistance would enable the two allies 
to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. 
However, Haqqani shows that Zia’s central preoc-
cupation remained India and not the Soviet pres-
ence in Afghanistan. 
The US capacity for self-delusion, Haqqani dem-
onstrates, has even afflicted intelligence collection 
on Pakistan. When organizing the Afghan resis-
tance, the Defense Intelligence Agency apparently 
placed great stock in the head of the Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant 
General Hamid Gul. It was blissfully unaware of 
Gul’s ideological predilections, which were firmly 
in the Islamist camp and viciously anti-American 
and anti-Western. His views certainly informed 
the decision making of the Pakistani military 
and facilitated the emergence of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. In turn, the Taliban provided a safe 
haven for Al Qaeda.
What is utterly baffling and astonishing is that 
the relationship, despite its mutually erroneous 
assumptions and tormented phases, has sur-
vived over decades. Periodically the United States 
has disengaged from Pakistan and even from 
the region. However, exigent circumstances have 
repeatedly led to renewed attempts at coopera-
tion. Unfortunately, most Pakistani interlocutors 
have repeatedly proved disingenuous on multiple 
fronts. Their American counterparts, in turn, 
thanks to their eagerness to address their own 
immediate strategic interests, have chosen to over-
look this bad faith. 
The unwillingness of both sides to forthrightly 
confront fundamentally divergent interests has 
persistently resulted in mutual disillusionment. 
Haqqani quite correctly suggests that placing the 
bilateral relationship on a more secure footing will 
require fundamental changes of behavior on both 
sides. As he says, “Unless Pakistanis define their 
national interests differently from how their lead-
ers have for six decades, the US-Pakistan alliance 
is only a mirage.” 
Policy makers—both in his homeland and 
in the United States—may find Haqqani’s blunt 
but accurate assessment discomfiting. But if they 
ignore his counsel it will be at their own peril. ■
From the archives 




RY IN THE MAKIN
G“In Kabul today, most 
Afghans, from illiterate 
cooks to well-educated 
civil servants, take it for 
granted that the Taliban are coming back to 
power. Afghans speak of yet another American 
betrayal, trading theories on why the United 
States and the international community have 
not been serious about combating the Taliban 
insurgency, stemming the flow of jihadists out 
of Pakistan, or devoting money and resources 
sufficient to rebuild the country.”
Ahmed Rashid
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